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Attorney Discipline for "Offensive
Personality" in California
By ROBERT C. BLACK*
According to one of the most venerable and dubious of legal
fictions, everyone is presumed to know the law.' Fortunately for our
peace of mind, most of us know little of the myriad laws we are obliged
to obey. Although they never discuss the subject, lawyers are well
aware that any serious attempt by the authorities to enforce all the en-
actments which technically are in force would sabotage the social or-
der.2 Despite the strictures of legal ethics,3 insofar as lawyers provide
guidance for the practical conduct of real life they necessarily counte-
nance and even commit nominal infractions routinely. With law, as
with everything else, there can be too much of a good thing; and if
there is anything we have too much of, it is law: "There is not much
danger of erring upon the side of too little law. The world is notori-
ously too much governed. ' '4
If this were merely a matter of involvement in a logical paradox,
* B.A., 1973, University of Michigan; J.D., 1977, Georgetown University Law
Center. Research Clerk, 1977-1978, Michigan Court of Appeals. Member, State Bar of Cal-
ifornia.
1. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 47, at 363 (1972).
2. The tactic of "working to rules"--where workers, instead of striking, remain on the
job and scrupulously abide by all the rules and laws they are officially enjoined to obey yet
unofficially expected to ignore-affords evidence of this. See R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED
TERRAIN 154-55 (1979). Police officers have created chaos in major cities by arresting or
ticketing everyone in sight who is technically breaking the law, and air traffic controllers
have reduced air traffic to a near-standstill by strict adherence to Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration regulations.
Michel Foucault has observed that a "margin of tolerated illegality" was a "condition
of the political and economic functioning of society" in pre-revolutionary France and adds:
"This feature may not have been peculiar to the Ancien R6gime." M. FOUCAULT, DISCI-
PLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 82 (1979).
3. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(A)(7) (attorney may not counsel client in conduct known to be illegal); STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7-101 (attorney may not advise the
violation of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal unless believing in good faith that it is
invalid).
4. G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 23 (5th ed. 1896).
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most lawyers, traditionally an unphilosophical breed,- likely would not
be unduly concerned.6 The underside of this state of affairs, however,
is the anxiety and uncertainty it inspires among the governed and the
opportunity for arbitrariness it affords the governors. Because attor-
neys may be disciplined for advising the violation of law,7 their clients'
vulnerability is also their own. But the danger is more direct than that.
The rules which lawyers have written for themselves8 are notoriously
ambiguous and obscure. Outside a few well-known situations, the im-
port of many of the rules is extraordinarily unclear. The resulting in-
terpretative elasticity confers enormous discretionary power on the
officials who enforce attorney discipline, yet ignorance of ethical obli-
gations has been held to be no defense to a charge of unprofessional
conduct.9
This Article will not reconsider the relationship of knowledge of
the law to legal culpability or even review directly the infirmities of the
rules of professional responsibility. Instead, it obliquely illuminates
these matters by undertaking a constitutional and policy analysis of a
single professional responsibility enactment: the statutory duty of a
California attorney to "abstain from all offensive personality.' 0
Unsystematic inquiries among California attorneys by this author
have failed to discover a single lawyer who was aware of this statute,
nor were any of those questioned able to derive its meaning from the
words of the enactment. Originally enacted in 1872 and couched, like
much of the law of legal ethics, in "quaint expressions of the past,""I
the statute has been described as "somewhat cryptic."' 12 Although judi-
cial treatment of the statute has failed to clarify its meaning, enforce-
ment efforts continue; the statute was invoked in a reported decision as
5. See C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (2d
ed. 1963).
6. In Holmes' hackneyed language: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. More accurately, they are the rules which a few lawyers-mainly representing the
corporate elite-have written for all. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 40-53 (1976);
Schuchman, Ethics and LegalEthics." The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968).
9. Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 603, 610-11, 510 P.2d 719, 723-24, 108 Cal. Rptr. 359,
363-64 (1973).
10. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(f) (West 1974).
11. "They [the former ABA Canons of Professional Ethics] were not cast in language
designed for disciplinary enforcement and many abounded with quaint expressions of the
past." Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY i.
12. 7 CAL. JUR. 3d Attorneys at Law § 76, at 344-45 (1973).
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recently as 1976.13 The extent of its enforcement in unreported State
Bar proceedings cannot be determined. More importantly, violation of
the statute appears to be endemic among the profession.' 4
California's offensive personality statute, like most of the presently
effective rules of legal ethics, was formulated long before the free ex-
pression guarantee of the first amendment was held to apply to the
states. 15 In the last twenty five years, however, constitutional chal-
lenges to long-established controls on bar admissions and attorney con-
duct, especially challenges premised upon first amendment rights of
expression and association, have been mounted with increasing suc-
cess. 16 Even today much of the profession may not realize how
portentous these developments are. By far the largest part of the rules
regulating attorneys controls the content of communication or expres-
sion, rather than restricting non-expressive conduct. Thus, these re-
straints qualify for the strict scrutiny reserved for enactments abridging
pure speech.17 Few of these enactments were devised to accommodate
first amendment values and many probably are vulnerable to invalida-
tion for vagueness or overbreadth. Unfortunately, instead of respond-
ing to these developments, to date the State Bar has defended the status
quo tenaciously.' 8 Much might be accomplished by way of reconciling
constitutional imperatives with legitimate regulatory interests if current
efforts were redirected toward a comprehensive and conscientious un-
dertaking to revise those rules which are salvageable and discard the
rest. As will appear from what follows, the offensive personality statute
probably belongs among the discards.
13. Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1976).
14. See notes 218-36 & accompanying text infra.
15. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,707 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 368 (1931).
16. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (ban on solicitation); Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ban on advertising); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) (admission to bar
of applicant refusing to furnish certain information on his political affiliations); UMW, Dist.
12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (right to obtain and to provide group legal
services); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (application of ban on solicitation to provi-
sion of legal services by political organization); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957)
(admission to bar despite applicant's former Communist Party connections); Jacoby v. State
Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977) (allegations of misrepresentation
and improper advertising by operators of legal clinic).
17. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967); Britt v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 855, 574 P.2d 766, 773, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 702 (1978).
18. See, e.g., Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 366, 562 P.2d 1326, 1331, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 82 (1977) (where the Bar claimed that use of the term "Legal Clinic" was use of an
assumed or misleading name); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 296-
301, 496 P.2d 1264, 1269-73, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 901-05 (1972) (where the Bar advanced a
variety of dubious arguments to justify the exclusion of aliens from the legal profession).
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"Offensive Personality": A Preliminary Approximation
The statute in question, Business and Professions Code section
6068(f), provides: "It is the duty of an attorney. . .[t]o abstain from
all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged."1 9 In contemporary California,
the word "personality" is virtually unintelligible in this context. In or-
dinary usage and as defined by the leading dictionaries, "personality"
refers to the totality of the attributes of a person, his or her manifest
character or characteristic modes of behavior.20 Section 6068(f) in all
likelihood was not intended to penalize an attorney for having an offen-
sive personality or for being an offensive person; to do so would appear
to be unconstitutional insofar as it penalized persons for their status
rather than their conduct.2' Nor is "personality" a legal term of art.22
With some difficulty, a definition was found which appears to fit:
"Anything said of a person, especially a disparaging or derogatory re-
19. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(f) (West 1974). Section 6068 enumerates various
duties of an attorney and provides in full: "It is the duty of an attorney:
"(a) To support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of [California].
"(b) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
"(c) To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as appear to
him legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense.
"(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him such
means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial office by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.
"(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the
secrets, of his client.
"(0 To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged.
"(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest.
"(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the de-
fenseless or the oppressed." Id. § 6068(a)-(h).
20. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1687
(3d ed. 1966).
21. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-67 (1962). But cf. Florida Bar v. Hefty,
213 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. 1968) (holding that, pursuant to a prohibition on offensive person-
alities, an attorney's indulgence in incest over a seven-year period "reflects a personality that
is offensive in the extreme"). See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 23-26 (1968).
22. One legal dictionary consulted contained no listing for "personality." See BALLEN-
TINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). Another furnished only an obviously inapposite
definition employed in the civil law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
The most recent edition of the latter dictionary contains no definition at all. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
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mark: usually in the plural; as, offensivepersonaliies.'"23 As a prelimi-
nary approximation, then, we may take "offensive personality" to mean
offensive24 references to persons.
To define personality is not to understand the statute, however, as
the statute does not merely forbid offensive personality. Rather, it im-
poses a duty on an attorney "[tlo abstain from all offensive personality,
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 25 Does this create one offense or two? Upon a first reading,
the interpretation by which two offenses are defined seems the more
natural, and no grammatical or logical necessity mandates the contrary
construction. Nonetheless, the unitary-offense interpretation, which
would require both an instance of offensive personality and a showing
of facts prejudicial to a party or witness, seems preferable for a number
of reasons. 26 Perhaps the most important of these is that this interpre-
tation maintains a nexus between legal practice and offensive personal-
ity as a basis for discipline; the offensive personality language, standing
alone, does not. As the following survey shows, the reported cases in-
23. FUNK & WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1844 (1949).
24. For a discussion of the meaning of "offensive," which itself conceals constitutional
difficulties, see notes 199-213 & accompanying text infra.
25. CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(f) (West 1974) (emphasis added).
26. For example, the fact that the language is simply a fragment of a sentence compris-
ing a single subdivision of a statute enumerating attorney duties suggests that some connec-
tion was intended. For reasons to be discussed later, absent some restriction of the statute to
statements incident to the practice of law, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. See
notes 163-90 & accompanying text infra. Where two interpretations of a statute are avail-
able, one of them rendering it constitutional and the other rendering it unconstitutional, the
saving construction ordinarily is to be preferred. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909). The unitary interpretation also makes it possible to view the sub-
section's scope as coextensive with, and intended as a substitute for, claims against attorneys
for defamation and the like which would be actionable but for the fact that such statements
by an attorney in the courtroom or in legal pleadings are absolutely privileged. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 47(2) (West 1954); Rader v. Thrasher, 22 Cal. App. 3d 883, 887-88, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 670, 672-73 (1972); Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 45-46, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354
(1969). Since this privilege disables the aggrieved individual from seeking redress on his or
her own, there is some justice in charging the legal profession, which benefits by the privi-
lege, with responsibility to protect the individuals they have thus rendered defenseless. See
Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 228 P.2d 554, 556 (1951). In any event, because the
statute is punitive in character, see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (characterizing
attorney discipline proceedings as "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature"), the
construction which limits its scope is perhaps to be favored. Cf. People v. Walker, 18 Cal. 3d
232, 242, 555 P.2d 306, 312, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526 (1976) (in a criminal proceeding the
construction of an ambiguous statute which is most favorable to the defendant must be
employed); People v. Moreland, 81 Cal. App. 3d 11, 17, 146 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (1978)
(same).
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voking the statute afford a measure of implicit support for this unitary
approach, since the subsection apparently has yet to be applied to com-
munications by attorneys acting in a private capacity unrelated to legal
practice. 27 Although this Article adopts the unitary-offense construc-
tion of the statute for purposes of analysis, the courts have never ad-
dressed the statute's structural ambiguity.
The Case Law on "Offensive Personality"
Since its enactment over a century ago, the offensive personality
statute has been invoked in only a small number of reported decisions.
In none of these cases was the statute construed or its operative terms
defined.28 Consequently, these cases are of little assistance in clarifying
the meaning of the statute. Indirectly, though, they suggest what the
statute perhaps has been assumed not to encompass. The decisions all
concern derogatory references, often false accusations, against particu-
lar natural persons. In all cases the offending attorney made the utter-
ance in connection with the representation of a client in a legal
proceeding. Those disparaged invariably were involved in the proceed-
ing, most commonly as judges, otherwise as parties, witnesses, or coun-
sel. Thus, these cases preserve at least a tenuous connection between
the discipline imposed and the practice of law, although the necessity
for this nexus has never been articulated. Most cases tend to favor the
unitary construction of the statute previously examined,2 9 although sev-
eral may be read to favor the binary construction by which "offensive
personality," standing alone, is punishable. If the limitations implicit
in the decisional law were codified by legislation or imposed on the
statute as a narrowing construction, this would go far, although not far
enough, to cure the constitutional infirmities discussed later in the Arti-
cle.
Seemingly the earliest decision to involve offensive personality was
In re Tyler.30 In that case an attorney was jailed for contempt for send-
ing a letter to a grand jury that was investigating his client. In the letter
the attorney accused many of the jurors of allowing themselves to be
corrupted by a person of wealth who was attempting to satisfy personal
motives. 3' In upholding the finding of contempt, the California
27. See notes 28-72 & accompanying text infra.
28. No presently accessible ethics opinions of the State Bar involved this statute. Thus,
reported appellate cases are the only sources available on the meaning of § 6068.
29. See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
30. 64 Cal. 434, 1 P. 884 (1884).
31. Id. at 435, 1 P. at 885.
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Supreme Court quoted in its entirety Code of Civil Procedure section
282, which later became Business and Professions Code section 6068.32
The Court denounced the attorney's attempt to influence the jurors as
both criminal and contumacious, 33 but did not say that the attorney
engaged in offensive personality. The judgment thus may well have
rested on other quoted provisions of the statute, such as the duty to
show respect to the courts of justice and judicial officers. More proba-
bly, however, the attempted jury-tampering violated the attorney's duty
to support the constitution and the laws. Nonetheless, if Tyler was an
offensive personality case, it is consistent with the judicial approach
described above. The attorney acted as the representative of a client;
the objectionable statements were addressed to judicial officials (grand
jurors) and referred both to those same jurors and apparently to a wit-
ness; and the utterance related to a legal proceeding then in progress.
In In re Philbrook,34 an attorney was suspended from practice for
three years for filing a brief with the California Supreme Court which
contained personal attacks on the members of the court and threatened
them with evil consequences if they decided an appeal against the at-
torney's client. The court described the accusations of corruption and
conspiracy as an "imaginary state of facts, founded on no evidence, and
without any probable cause."'35 Accordingly, the court held:
Our conclusion is that by filing said brief the respondent, Phil-
brook, has violated his duty as an attorney "to maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers," [sic] and to abstain
from offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the jus-
tice of the cause with which he was charged," as declared in section
282 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that for such reason he
should be suspended from his office of attorney at law.36
Philbrook is typical of offensive personality adjudications in that the
charge overlapped with other, more concrete charges, in this case disre-
spect for the courts. As to defining offensive personality, the decision is
ambiguous. The facts suggest that the offense may have consisted not
of offensive personality alone and as such, but also included advancing
facts prejudicial to the honor or reputation of parties or witnesses,
namely, those accused of corrupting and conspiring with the judges.
Twenty-three years after In re Philbrook, the lawyer who had been
32. Id. at 436-37, 1 P. at 886.
33. Id. at 438, 1 P. at 887.
34. 105 Cal. 471, 38 P. 884 (1895).
35. Id. at 476, 38 P. at 885.
36. Id. at 480, 38 P. at 887.
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suspended from practice in that case apparently was once again the
subject of a disciplinary proceeding. In Bar Association of San Fran-
cisco v. Phibrook,37 the attorney filed an affidavit with the court in a
civil action accusing various superior court judges and others of engag-
ing in a "wicked and criminal conspiracy" against his client to secure a
"false and corrupt" judgment for the defendant. 38 The resulting
charges brought against the attorney included breach of his duty to re-
spect the courts and judicial officers, offensive personality, and unpro-
fessional conduct.39 The court of appeal, in sustaining the attorney's
disbarment,40 observed that to permit personal attacks of this character
"would be to suffer the judicial respect, integrity, honor, and reputation
of courts and judges to be attacked and overthrown with no opportu-
nity for either defense, justification, or redress on the part of those as-
sailed."'41 Again, the opinion does not rely explicitly on offensive
personality as the basis for its decision. Significantly, this case, like the
others reviewed, did not involve profane, vulgar, "offensive" language;
the objections to the utterances went to their false and dishonoring con-
tent rather than to the manner in which they were expressed. More-
over, the court's allusion to the lack of redress for those maligned in
this way tends to support the construction whereby the scope of the
statute's prohibition would be coextensive with the scope of the various
privileges shielding otherwise tortious statements made by attorneys in
connection with litigation.42
In In re Sadicof, 4 3 counsel for an actress who was a party to a
breach of contract action argued for the deposing of his client privately,
before a superior court judge, because of the risk of exposure of "sala-
cious and scandalous statements, to the detriment of her reputation and
honor. '44 Such exposure already had occurred during related litigation
in New York. Opposing counsel Sadicoff and another attorney mooted
the matter by preparing an affidavit which set forth at length the de-
famatory matter. The affidavit contained allegations of "scurrilous, im-
moral and perhaps fictitious matters prejudicial to the honor and
character of said actress, publication of which would injure her reputa-
37. 35 Cal. App. 460, 170 P. 440 (1917).
38. Id. at 461, 170 P. at 440.
39. Id. at 461-62, 170 P. at 440.
40. Id. at 465, 170 P. at 442.
41. Id. at 463, 170 P. at 441.
42. This construction was suggested earlier at note 26 supra.
43. 208 Cal. 555, 282 P. 952 (1929).
44. Id. at 556-57, 282 P. at 953.
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tion and could even destroy her earning capacity . . . . 45 Sadicoff
and Abrahams, the other attorney involved, served the affidavit upon
the opposing parties but did not file it with the court for five days, de-
spite a court order sealing the document. Subsequently its contents
were communicated by petitioner Sadicoff to an eastern newspaper cor-
respondent, who thereafter was furnished with a copy. In reviewing
Sadicoff's resultant six-month suspension, the California Supreme
Court quoted three statutory duties of an attorney: to refrain from of-
fensive personality and advance no prejudicial facts; to comply with
court orders; and to refrain from acts of moral turpitude, dishonesty,
and corruption.46 Without stating which of these duties had been
breached, the Court sustained the discipline:
The evidence adduced fully warrants the conclusion that said
acts of petitioners, and especially their conduct with respect to said
affidavit and the motives and purposes which actuated them during
said period, constituted a violation of their duties as attorneys. In an
action of the character established by the complaint in said case, ref-
erences such as those contained in said affidavit to certain of the par-
ties obviously were not justified but were inexcusable, vindictive and
diliberately [sic] offensive-in fact, clear evidence of bad faith on the
part of counsel both toward the parties themselves and the court.47
Both the court's reference to offensive personality and the facts of the
case suggest that offensive personality likely was at least one basis for
discipline here. Moreover, the languge of the opinion lends support to
the unitary-offense construction of the statute. By referring to "matters
prejudicial to the honor and character" of the actress, the court tracks
the latter portion of the offensive personality subsection, implying that
violation of this second requirement was a necessary and perhaps suffi-
cient predicate for upholding the discipline imposed. As usual, the of-
fensive personality infringement overlaps with others.
An additional element of offensive personality was hinted at in
Peters v. State Bar,48 in which the accusations again were threefold:
failure to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers; violation of the oath to faithfully discharge the duties of an
attorney; and failure to abstain from offensive personality.49 Peters, the
attorney, filed a motion to disqualify a Judge Church for behaving "in
45. Id. at 557, 282 P. at 953.
46. Id. at 557-58, 282 P. at 953-54.
47. Id. at 558, 282 P. at 954.
48. 219 Cal. 218, 26 P.2d 19 (1933).
49. Id. at 218-19, 26 P.2d at 19 (citing former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 282(2), (6),
278).
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a very ostentatious, very child-like, and very foolish manner."50 After
Judge Murray denied the motion, Peters moved to disqualify him for
acting "willfully and in wanton disregard of the plaintiffs rights" and
deciding the matter "without one iota of evidence." 51 Judge Harris de-
nied that motion, whereupon Peters moved to disqualify Judge Harris
for "judicial oppression and misconduct of the most amazing charac-
ter."' 52 Meanwhile, back in the original probate proceeding, Peters filed
points and authorities asserting that the executor's attorney was "un-
scrupulous," that he deliberately misled the court, and that he lied "to
bolster up a wretchedly degraded piece of business. ' 53 In subsequent
disciplinary proceedings Peters failed to substantiate any of his charges,
which the court found were made "with at least a conscious careless-
ness as to their truth or falsity. '54 The California Supreme Court ob-
served that "an attorney may not go 'out of his way to introduce
something purposely and gratuitously offensive.'-55 The court con-
cluded Peters had done this by his various accusations, reasoning
that they [the accusations] are offensive can admit of no doubt. The
gratuitous character of some is established by the lack of any materi-
ality to the issues involved; that of others by the failure of even a
shadow of proof to support them. This situation, in addition to what
has already been said, sufficiently supports a conclusion that offense
was intended. 56
These comments by the court may add something new if they mean
that willfulness is an element of an offensive personality violation;
otherwise, the case fits the usual pattern described and fails to elucidate
the meaning of offensive personality.
Hogan v. State Bar57 dealt, like many of these cases, with personal
attacks on a judge. In an amended motion for a new trial, the attorney
involved accused the judge of being a "petty judge" who acted as pros-
ecutor and attorney for the plaintiff and discriminated against certain
witnesses because of their religion.5 8 Later, in an "Open Letter" ad-
dressed to the State Bar, he further disparaged the same judge's fairness
as well as the quality of his legal education.5 9 The California Supreme
50. 219 Cal. at 219-20, 26 P.2d at 19-20.
51. Id. at 220-21, 26 P.2d at 20.
52. Id. at 221, 26 P.2d at 20.
53. Id. at 222, 26 P.2d at 20.
54. Id. at 223, 26 P.2d at 21.
55. Id. at 224, 26 P.2d at 21 (quoting Works v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. 304, 307, 62 P.
507, 508 (1900)).
56. 219 Cal. at 224, 26 P.2d at 21-22.
57. 36 Cal. 2d 807, 228 P.2d 554 (1951).
58. Id. at 808-09, 228 P.2d at 555-56.
59. Id. at 809-10, 228 P.2d at 556.
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Court found that the accusations against the judge were "without satis-
factory explanation":
There was no evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing to justify
them. They stand as lapses in professional deportment and fully
warranted the conclusion of the board that the petitioner violated his
duty under section 6068(f) to abstain from offensive personality
.... It is equaly apparent that the petitioner has violated his duty
under section 6068(b) to maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers.60
The supreme court sustained the discipline as to all charges. 61 Al-
though the court's reliance on section 6068(f) as a basis for discipline
was explicit in this case, the offensive personality charge once again
duplicated the charge of evincing disrespect to the courts. As in prior
cases, the discipline related to otherwise privileged litigation related re-
marks, which the court explicitly acknowledged. 62 This is the first case,
however, which is inconsistent with the unitary construction of the stat-
utes: here no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness was advanced. Instead, offensive personality alone, as de-
scribed in the first half of section 6068(f), had to be the basis of punish-
ment. In addition, if the "petty judge" remark actually was
independently punishable, this is also the first case in which offensive
language was adjudged a reason for discipline. Whether the opinion
did extend the scope of the statute in this way cannot be determined
from a mere reading of the decision. Clearly, however, the broad inter-
pretation of section 6068(f) in Hogan accentuates the statute's over-
breadth and any attempt to narrow its scope by amendment or
construction will have to disapprove the decision.
In Hawk v. Superior Court,63 a defense attorney was held in con-
tempt for making disparaging references to the prosecutor in the pres-
ence of the jury, after being warned not to do so. Although Hawk was
a contempt proceeding rather than an attorney discipline case, the
court of appeal did invoke the offensive personality statute in uphold-
ing the trial court's action:
Petitioner's reference to the prosecutor as a "high-priced lawyer" was
behavior calculated to irritate the prosecutor and to annoy the court,
and was a violation of his duty to abstain from all offensive personal-
ity. For this violation of his duties, after having been warned to re-
frain from such conduct, petitioner was properly held in contempt of
60. Id. at 810, 228 P.2d at 556 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 811, 228 P.2d at 556.
62. Id. at 810-11, 228 P.2d at 556.
63. 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
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the authority of the court .... 64
The situation in Hawk illustrates the problems which arise in the typi-
cal application of section 6068(f). The attorney being disciplined could
have been held in contempt regardless of whether his comments consti-
tuted offensive personality; the inherent power of a trial court to control
courtroom proceedings and the attorney's duty to obey a lawful court
order65 certainly are well recognized bases for punishment. As a result,
no definition of the offensive personality violation is required or
emerges. The necessity and desirability of this vague statute are called
into question by this pattern of application; where a reason for punish-
ing an attorney for objectionable speech arises, well recognized and de-
fined grounds for discipline seem to be available.
The most recent reported offensive personality case, Heavey P.
State Bar,66 is consistent with previous patterns, although it reveals
that the California Supreme Court has qualms about the constitution-
ality of section 6068. The case concerned an attorney who wrote letters
to a judge requesting annulment of a fine imposed upon him for failure
to have his client answer an interrogatory. No copies of the letters were
provided to opposing counsel. In one letter, the attorney referred to the
fine as a "savage reprisal" and accused the judge of cowardice.67 Disci-
pline was sustained on a charge of communicating with the court with-
out notice to the adverse party.68 There was a further charge of
"engaging in offensive personality, coupled with a lack of respect for a
judicial officer."' 69 The attorney objected on constitutional grounds to
the finding below that he had engaged in offensive personality. In a
curious passage the California Supreme Court, despite declaring that
the attorney had indeed violated some unidentified portion of section
6068, avoided the unspecified constitutional objections by reversing the
finding of a violation:
We need not decide the validity of petitioner's constitutional
contentions. The vice of petitioner's letters to the judge was not so
much in the gross tastelessness of their prose, but in their apparent
intent to improperly induce the annulment of an order properly
made. The appropriate means for seeking to persuade a judge to
change a decision is by a motion to be heard in open court, with an
opportunity for opposing counsel to air his views. Petitioner's willful
64. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 129-30, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 727 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1209(3), (5)).
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 1974).
66. 17 Cal. 3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1976).
67. Id. at 557, 551 P.2d at 1240, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 408
68. Id. at 558-59, 551 P.2d at 1241-42, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
69. Id. at 556, 551 P.2d at 1239-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
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failure to comply with such an elementary principle of fairness is
already dealt with, however, in the board's finding that he violated
former rule 16. Therefore, little would be added by further discus-
sion of petitioner's letters, particularly because the board was ade-
quately justified in recommending discipline solely on the basis of
the violations of rules 9 and 16. Under these circumstances the viola-
tion of Business and Professions Code section 6068 is redundant to
the rule 16 charge, and we do not find petitioner to have been guilty
thereof. In disposing of the issue in this manner, however, we by no
means condone petitioner's offensive and totally unwarranted attack
against a member of the bench; rather, we condemn such unprofes-
sional conduct.70
To reverse the section 6068 discipline as "redundant" is remarkable
indeed, since, as indicated earlier, every finding of an offensive person-
ality violation has been redundant in this sense. Since the purposes of
section 6068 and of the rule against secret communications with the
court are altogether different, and since one readily may violate one
without violating the other, the court's dubious explanation for its ac-
tion cannot be taken at face value. Rather, the court, although stigma-
tizing the attorney's conduct as "unprofessional," apparently desired to
avoid addressing the constitutional challenge to the offensive personal-
ity statute. The language of the opinion, which must be considered
dictum, fails to identify whether offensive language, disrespect for a
judicial officer, or both provided the bases for the redundant section
6068 violation.
Thus, no offensive personality case has gone beyond parroting the
language of the statute; none has attempted a definition of "offensive
personality." In practice, section 6068(f) thus far has been applied only
to litigation-related client advocacy.71 The utterances at issue always
were addressed to or in reference to judicial officers; many were both.
Apparently all such utterances were privileged for purposes of redress
in tort. The charge has always been a makeweight, since there has al-
ways been another basis for the discipline imposed. There is no assur-
ance, however, that the statute has not been used or will not be used to
control a much wider range of attorney expression.72
70. Id. at 559-60, 551 P.2d at 1242, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
71. The discussion of offensive personality in P. FLYNN, HANDBOOK ON CALIFORNIA
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 5.62, at 238 (1976) is placed under the heading Conduct
Toward Litigants and Jury.
72. In a period when the legal profession has lost prestige and is subjected to harsh
criticism, officials may be tempted to avoid fundamental issues by "cracking down" on
"abuses" in isolated cases. An example was the State Bar's major effort, ultimately crowned
with some success, to discipline Melvin Belli for minor self-laudatory representations. Belli
v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1974). The matters com-
plained of were so trivial that it is difficult to account for the State Bar's zeal except in terms
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Despite the apparent infrequency with which the statute has been
enforced in the past, the potential for impropriety in the future by those
seeking to censure an attorney for offensive personality is manifest.
For example, there is nothing on the face of the offensive personality
statute which would preclude its application in the following situations:
1. A prosecutor writes a best-seller about a controversial prosecu-
tion he or she has conducted; in it the principal defendant is portrayed
as a brutal, immoral mass-murderer with an entourage of slavish devo-
tees.7
3
2. An attorney, driving to work, is caught in a traffic jam, and
curses a careless motorist who has damaged his or her car. 74
3. An attorney protests a rent increase by writing an insulting
letter to the landlord.
4. During closing argument to the jury in a criminal trial, the
prosecutor, based on evidence in the record, applies harsh epithets to
the defendant. 75
5. An attorney running for the office of district attorney publicly
assails the incumbent as incompetent, lazy, corrupt, or unintelligent. 76
6. A lawyer drafts a complaint which accuses the defendant of
willful and wanton misconduct; the charges later are found to be with-
out merit.
7. An attorney records disparaging references to clients, judges,
and opposing counsel in a diary.
8. An attorney writes a largely favorable reference for an appli-
cant to the State Bar disclosing, however, his knowledge that the appli-
cant is bad-tempered and a near-alcoholic. 77
9. A lawyer participates in the "roast" of a friend and colleague,
during which he makes humorous but biting remarks about the guest of
honor.
of a felt need to prove and publicize its disciplinary effectiveness by punishing a celebrated,
colorful, and controversial lawyer.
73. See V. BUGLIOSi, HELTER SKELTER (1974) (prosecutor's version of the Charles
Manson killings).
74. See City of Oak Park v. Smith, 79 Mich. App. 757, 759-60, 262 N.W.2d 900, 901-02
(1977) (motorist giving out-of-uniform policeman "the finger" after a near traffic accident).
75. See notes 219-23 & accompanying text infra.
76. See San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 12, 1979, at 20, col. 2 (accusations exchanged
among candidates for San Francisco District Attorney). For another example of an attor-
ney-politician disparaging others see G. FORD & J. STILES, PORTRAIT OF THE ASSASSIN
(1965) (biography of Lee Harvey Oswald co-authored by then-future President Ford).
77. Cf STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-101 (a
lawyer shall not further the application for bar admission of a person known to be unquali-
fied); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 1-101(B) (same).
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While these hypotheticals differ in a number of ways, they all ar-
guably are within the sweep of the offensive personality ban. Most at-
torneys, however, would consider all these cases preposterous pretexts
for disciplinary proceedings and probably all attorneys would agree
that most of them are beyond the State Bar's purview. In placing
proper limits on attorney discipline by the State Bar, the fundamental
concern must be that, insofar as section 6068(f) proscribes some forms
of expression as "offensive personality," enforcement of the statute di-
rectly implicates constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression.
"Offensive Personality" and the First Amendment
Underlying Values and the Burden of Persuasion
Political debate, the very core of protected expression, 78 "may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials."' 79 In other words, it may include
offensive personality. Moreover, although some instances of offensive
personality may further recognized first amendment purposes relating
to political expression, "the First Amendment does not protect speech
and assembly only to the extent that it can be characterized as politi-
cal." °80 The right of free expression encompasses many fields of human
interest8' and protects both the individual's interest in self-expression
and society's interest in open and informed discussion.82 In fact, gener-
ally the government may not regulate the content of protected speech. 83
"Offensive personality," intenfded to accentuate a protest or criticism or
just serving to blow off steam, is not too plebeian to qualify for protec-
tion; these too are proper purposes of expression. 84
Free speech enjoys a preferred position among constitutional guar-
78. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). The Supreme Court has referred to
free speech as the "essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964).
79. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
80. UMW, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
81. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
82. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). See also T. EMERSON, To-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966) (free speech is "an integral
part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self").
83. Dulaney v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. 3d 77, 85, 520 P.2d 1, 7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 777,
783 (1974).
84. See, e.g., Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 397-98, 541 P.2d 80, 82-83 (1975); People
v. Klick, 66 Ill. 2d 269, 274-75, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (1977); City of Oak Park v. Smith, 79
Mich. App. 757, 762, 262 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1977).
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antees and the courts are especially vigilant in protecting its exercise.8 5
The presumption of constitutionality that normally attends a legislative
enactment is inapplicable when the issue is whether freedom of expres-
sion has been abridged.86 Instead, once a court finds that a fundamen-
tal interest is at stake, the burden of persuasion falls on those defending
the statute under attack.87 This principle is applicable when legal eth-
ics is the basis for repression, as in other cases. 88 These considerations
illustrate the background of distrust of statutes restricting communica-
tion against which the constitutional questions raised by the offensive-
personality statute must be viewed.
The Exceptions to First Amendment Protection
Although the right of free speech is not absolute as to all times and
under all circumstances, a state may prevent or punish only certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech.89 Most situations
in which a state may regulate the form or content of speech fall within
these established exceptions; 90 basic principles of free speech and a free
press "make freedom of expression the rule." 91 Ordinarily the failure
of an enactment to correspond precisely with one or more of the excep-
tions results in its invalidation for overbreadth. A statute that on its
face prohibits some protected utterances is unconstitutionally over-
broad, even if it also applies to some unprotected utterances. Unless a
facially invalid statute previously has been authoritatively construed so
as to affect only unprotected speech, it is overbroad even if the actual
speech in question in a particular case might have been regulated under
a properly limited statute.92 "Because First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
85. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88
(1949).
86. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,
386 (1962). Another view-arguably a sound one-is that a presumption of
unconstitutionality attaches to a speech-repressive statute. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). In a free speech case, the presumption of consti-
tutionality is either greatly weakened or dropped. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,
356 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
87. Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 620, 626 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
88. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
89. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
90. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
91. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (quoting Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
92. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-34 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
[Vol. 31
only with narrow specificity. '93 Accordingly, unless section 6068(f) can
be justified by one or more of the major exceptions to first amendment
protection, the restrictions on expression mandated by the statute can-
not be constitutionally tolerated. The discussion of the established ex-
ceptions which follows demonstrates that "offensive personality"
should not be removed from the ambit of free speech protection and
that, indeed, the statute does not allow the breathing space required for
freedom of expression.
One exception to first amendment protection, arguably relevant to
a consideration of discipline for offensive personality, is defamation,
which receives only limited constitutional protection.94 Undoubtedly
some offensive personality is defamatory; just as clearly, however, sec-
tion 6068(f) prohibits much more than defamation. In the first place,
an essential element of this tort is that the publication in question con-
tain a false statement of fact. 95 The offensive personality statute on its
face applies to "all offensive personality," and while some earlier deci-
sions dwell upon the falsity of the statements punished,96 other deci-
sions have sustained discipline without intimating that the statements
made were false.97 In others, no statement of fact appears at all.98 Ad-
ditionally, nothing in section 6068(f) limits its application to statements
disseminated to third parties. Without such publication, an action for
defamation will not lie.99 Finally, the California libel statute excepts
93. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 527 (1958).
94. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 327-28, 332-39 (1974); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum).
95. Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 600, 552 P.2d 425, 427, 131
Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45, 46 (West 1954) (defining libel and slander,
respectively).
96. See, e.g., Peters v. State Bar, 219 Cal. 218, 223, 26 P.2d 19, 21 (1933); In re Phil-
brook, 105 Cal. 471, 476, 38 P. 884, 885 (1895).
97. See, e.g., In re Sadicoff, 208 Cal. 555, 557, 282 P. 952, 953 (1929) (referring to
statements containing "scurrilous, immoral and perhaps fictitious matters" (emphasis ad-
ded)); Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 129-30, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 727 (1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 35 Cal. App.
460, 463, 170 P. 440, 441-42 (1917).
98. See, e.g., Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 553, 557, 559, 551 P.2d 1238, 1240, 1242,
131 Cal. Rptr. 406, 408, 410 (1976) (where an attorney in letters addressed a judge as "Your
Majesty" and complained of a fine as a "savage reprisal"; the issue was whether to discipline
the attorney "for the particular language used").
99. Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59, 69,28 P. 845, 847 (1892); Scott v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 277, 291, 112 Cal. Rptr. 609, 619 (1974). There is no publication
where the statement is made by the defendant to the plaintiff and the plaintiff then publishes
it to third parties. See Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911, 916, 183 P.2d 318, 322
(1947).
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privileged communications from the category of libel. ' 00 The offensive
personality statute does not; California courts have held that publica-
tions privileged for tort purposes are subject to punishment as offensive
personality.101 Thus the statute, on its face and as construed, fails to
accomodate the qualified privilege attached to defamation of public of-
ficials, which protects such statements unless made with "actual mal-
ice," i e., with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of their
truth or falsity. 10 2 A statute which has not been construed to exclude
this privileged form of offensive personality is unconstitutional.10 3
The second major exception, obscenity, is entirely outside the pro-
tective ambit of the first amendment. 1°4 The currently accepted defini-
tion of obscenity comes from Miller v. California:l05
The basic guidelines for the trier of facts must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest ...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 10 6
While one might, with difficulty, conceive of some offensive personality
which was legally obscene, plainly the offensive personality statute as
written meets none of the Miller criteria. There is nothing limiting its
application to material appealing to "the prurient interest," I e., mate-
rial that is, "in some significant way, erotic" 107 or "having a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts."' 0 8 While sexually pejorative statements are
common components of offensive personality, their sexual allusions are
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1954).
101. Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 810-11, 228 P.2d 554, 556 (1951).
102. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). This constitutionally
grounded privilege reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials." Id. at 270. Political rhetoric, which is "often vituperative, abusive, and inexact,"
extends even to a hyperbolic death threat against the President, although this represented "a
kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President." Watts
v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906
(1975).
104. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957).
105. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
106. Id. at 24.
107. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). See also Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d
1012, 1013 (Alaska 1971).
108. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
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not enough to render them obscene. 10 9 Moreover, section 6068(f) is not
limited to depictions or descriptions of enumerated forms of sexual
conduct, nor does the statute exclude otherwise punishable offensive
personality which has literary or other social value, although invective
occasionally rises to the level of literature. 10 In sum, there is no indi-
cation that a tenable argument for upholding the statute can be made
on this basis.
Because offensive personality could, in some circumstances, consti-
tute an invasion of privacy, the statute might be thought to protect the
right to privacy. The only communications to unwilling auditors which
may be restricted, however, are those that invade the privacy of the
home." ' I Furthermore, if the protection of privacy or of a "captive au-
dience" is the rationale for repression, the statute must be tightly drawn
to protect the home but to be inapplicable in any other setting." 2 For
instance, the distribution of leaflets criticizing a realtor's business prac-
tices, distributed in his or her neighborhood, cannot be enjoined as an
invasion of privacy, although the leaflets list the realtor's address and
telephone number.1 3 With respect to a protection of privacy rationale,
a statute prohibiting the dissemination of communications to persons
who have no objection to receiving them as well as to those who do is
unconstitutionally overbroad.' 14
109. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)
(per curiam) (newspaper reference to "Mother Fucker" held not obscene); Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972) (per curiam) (Powell, J., dissenting) (repeated references to
"mother fuckers"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("Fuck the Draft" inscription
on a jacket held not obscene).
110. See, e.g., DEAR SIR, DROP DEAD! HATE MAIL THROUGH THE AGES 26, 28-29, 30,
119, 126-28, 140 (D. Carroll ed. 1979) (hate letters by Hunter Thompson, Oscar Wilde, Al-
gernon Swinburne, Samuel Johnson, H.L..Mencken, and Thomas Paine).
I 11. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (homeown-
er has unlicensed discretion to forbid erotic mailings to his or her residence); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sustaining ban on sound trucks whose noise penetrated into
homes).
112. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1972). See also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.
313 (1972) (per curiam).
113. Provided the means are peaceful, the communications need not meet standards of
acceptability. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971).
114. Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 825-26, 489
P.2d 809, 814, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042 (1972). To pass
muster as a privacy-protective statute, an enactment may proscribe only communications
made in circumstances where "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essen-
tially intolerable manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). Thus, the offensive
personality statute would have to be construed to apply only to this specific class of "intoler-
able," invasive communications or other categories of unprotected speech. See, e.g., State v.
Jaeger, 249 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Iowa 1977); In re Simmons, 24 N.C. App. 28, 30-31, 210
S.E.2d 84, 86 (1974); People v. Smith, 89 Misc. 2d 789, 791-92, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (App.
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The final exception available to salvage this enactment is "fighting
words." Originally, the term fighting words was defined as a statement
"the direct tendency of which was to provoke the person against whom
it was directed to acts of violence."' 15 More recently, the definition has
been narrowed to encompass only "those personally abusive epithets
which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of com-
mon knowledge, inherently likely to produce violent reaction."" 6
Thus, fighting words consist of name-calling that takes place in a face-
to-face confrontation. Mere offensive conduct is not punishable as
fighting words unless "there [is] a clear and present danger that vio-
lence will imminently erupt."'" 7 The offensive personality statute, on
the other hand, has never been limited to fighting words. There is no
limitation to "personally abusive epithets";' 18 section 6068(f) might be
and has been applied to accusations of objectionable conduct." 9 Addi-
tionally, the offensive personality statute lacks any requirement that the
words in question be directed to the person to which they refer. No
matter how offensive or inflammatory they may be, words cannot be
fighting words if they are not addressed to anyone in particular, 120 yet
many offensive personality cases have involved disparaging references
to third parties not present.' 2' Finally, the statute is not limited, either
Term), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). Few of the reported offensive personality cases
involve communications which could be considered an invasion of privacy, however. See,
e.g., Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 808-10, 228 P.2d 554, 555-56 (1951) (attacks on a
judge in pleadings and in an "Open Letter" to the State Bar); Hawk v. Superior Court, 42
Cal. App. 3d 108, 129, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 727 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975)
(reference in open court to prosecutor as a "high-priced lawyer"). But c In re Sadicoff, 208
Cal. 555, 556-57, 282 P. 952, 953 (1929) (exposure of "salacious and scandalous" statements
about an actress).
115. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 n.8 (1942).
116. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
117. Inre Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 618, 510 P.2d 1017, 1020, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 950 (1974). See Jefferson v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 721, 725,
124 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (1975).
118. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
119. See, e.g., In re Philbrook, 105 Cal. 471, 476-77, 38 P. 884, 885-86 (1895); In re
Tyler, 64 Cal. 434, 435, 1 P. 884, 885 (1884); Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 35 Cal.
App. 460, 461, 170 P. 440, 441-42 (1917). The mere falsity of utterances does not justify their
suppression. To protect the process of ascertainment and publication of the truth, it is essen-
tial that the first amendment protect some false statements as well as true ones. Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51-52 (1971) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 732 (1968)).
120. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973) (per curiam); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Jefferson v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 721, 725, 124 Cal. Rptr. 507,
509 (1975).
121. See, e.g., Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 809-10, 228 P.2d 554, 555-56 (1951)
(disparaging references to a judge in a letter to the State Bar); Peters v. State Bar, 219 Cal.
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on its face or as applied, to face-to-face utterances. Rather, its unquali-
fied scope makes it applicable to communications by telephone, 22 by
letter, by skywriting, or by any other medium, no matter how far re-
moved the offender and the offended may be. A transatlantic telecast
or a transcontinental letter could hardly contain fighting words but
might well include offensive personality. For many reasons, then, sec-
tion 6068(f) is substantially overbroad with respect to fighting words as
it is with respect to all other first amendment exceptions.' 23
Offensive Language and the First Amendment
Of course, the foregoing analysis would be immaterial if the offen-
siveness of expression were a sufficient justification for its suppression.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly and un-
equivocally rejected this rationale.124 The notion that speech may be
restricted or punished because someone finds it offensive is alien to our
political and legal tradition. The first amendment protects speech that
is in bad taste,125 induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction,
or even stirs people to anger.126 Accordingly, publications of no possi-
ble value to society deserve as much protection as the best of litera-
ture.' 27 Even those justices of the Supreme Court with the least
sympathy for offensive modes of expression concede that "[s]ome uses
of even the most offensive words are unquestionably protected."' 28
Thus American constitutional law, by protecting offensive speech in the
218, 219-21, 26 P.2d 19, 19-21 (1933) (abusive motion to disqualify a judge, heard by a
different judge).
122. See Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975);
Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Alaska 1971).
123. Among other exceptions, obviously irrelevant, are incitement to imminent lawless
action, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam), and false or misleading
commercial speech, Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
124. See generally Rutznick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment
Protection, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 1 (1974).
125. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 n.40 (1972).
126. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 398,
541 P.2d 80, 83 (1975).
127. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Speech does not, by and large,
have to be justified as socially valuable to enjoy protection: "The constitutional protection
does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered."' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
128. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J.). Chief Justice
Burger authored the opinion holding that the peaceful dissemination of information con-
cerning a person's business practices did not have to meet standards of acceptability. Organ-
ization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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same manner as other speech, 12 9 effectively incorporates the view of
John Stuart Mill, who long ago pointed out that the interests at stake
are incommensurable: "[T]here is no parity between the feeling of a
person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended
at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a
purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it." 130
The leading case in this area is Cohen v. California,13 1 in which the
Supreme Court reversed an "offensive conduct" conviction of the de-
fendant which was based on his wearing a jacket inscribed with the
statement "Fuck the Draft." The conviction rested solely on the offen-
siveness of the words employed. 132 Among the issues presented was
whether "California can excise, as 'offensive conduct,' one particular
scurrilous epithet from the public discourse," acting on a theory that
"the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly re-
move this offensive word from the public vocabulary."' 133 The Court
concluded that the individual and societal interests in uninhibited ex-
pression outweighed any state interest in enforced verbal decorum:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often ap-
pear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.
These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side
effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open de-
bate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with
verbal cacaphony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of
strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise
might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful
abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly im-
plicated. That is why "[w]holly neutral futilities. . . come under the
protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's ser-
mons". . . and why "so long as the means are peaceful, the commu-
nication need not meet standards of acceptability .... ,,134
To this the Court added that any attempt to eradicate particular offen-
sive words necessarily would reduce discourse to a lowest common de-
nominator of sanitized mediocrity. 135
129. "The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for sup-
pressing it." FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J.). Similarly,
annoyance is insufficient justification for suppression of speech. Coates v. City of Cincin-
nati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971); see People v. Klick, 66 Ill. 2d 269, 275, 362 N.E.2d 329, 332
(1977).
130. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 123 (1955).
131. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. at 22-23.
134. Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 25. The Court stated: "How is one to distinguish this from any other offen-
sive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
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If offensiveness as such cannot be the basis for restricting speech,
then a statute with the explicit purpose of prohibiting offensive speech
is overbroad. Statutes restricting offensive language are unconstitution-
ally overbroad unless and until construed so that they are "not suscep-
tible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."'' 36 For example,
in Bolles v. People37 the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a statute
that prohibited as harassment communications with others made with
the "intent to harass, annoy or alarm," and in a manner "likely to har-
ass or cause alarm."' 38 The court noted that although the statute might
have legitimate application to "obscene, libelous, riotous communica-
tion," it nonetheless was overbroad because many utterances which are
intended to annoy others are protected by the first amendment: 39
[O]ne is guilty of the crime of harassment if he intends to "alarm"
another person-arouse to a sense of danger-and communicates to
that other person in a manner likely to cause alarm. It would there-
fore be criminal in Colorado to forecast a storm, predict political
trends, warn against illnesses, or discuss anything that is of any sig-
nificance.
So, also, if one has the intent to annoy-to irritate with a net-
tling or exasperating effect-. . . he is guilty of harassment. The ab-
surdity of this is patently obvious to anyone who envisions our
society in anything but a state of languid repose. The First Amend-
ment is made of sterner stuff ....
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable gen-
eral principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below.
For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful
than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another
man's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make prin-
cipled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual." Id.
136. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); cf Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
590-91 (1969) (burning American flag and inflammatory language could not be punished
under overbroad statute).
137. 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975).
138. The statute provided: "A person commits harrassment if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or annoy another person, he: . . .communicates with a person, anonymously or
otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of communication, in a manner
likely to harass or cause alarm ... " Id. at 395 n.l, 541 P.2d at 81. Similarly, in Walker v.
Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975), the Court held to be unen-
forceable a statute forbidding any person to "curse or abuse anyone, or use vulgar, profane,
threatening or obscene language over any telephone." 523 F.2d at 4 n.1. Nearly every one
of these adjectives was said to be susceptible of an overbroad application. Id. at 5. Citing
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), the Court held that even the ban on threats was
overbroad until construed to avoid application "to inhibit robust debate which, in the politi-
cal arena, is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact." Id. at 5.
139. 189 Colo. at 397, 541 P.2d at 82.
May 1980] OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In effect, if unsettling, disturbing, arousing, or annoying com-
munications could be proscribed, or if they could only be conveyed
in a manner that would not alarm, the protection of the First Amend-
ment would be a mere shadow indeed.' 40
Thus, this case not only illustrates the overbreadth problem inherent in
regulating offensive speech, but indicates another reason that attempts
to control offensive or annoying speech are "absurd": Taken seriously,
such attempts would wreak havoc with much of the commonly ac-
cepted conversational currency of everyday life.
In addition to this danger, and the potential for stifling political
dialogue,' 4' a third reason for protecting offensive speech is that it is
perfectly proper to offend others, even intentionally, to accentuate the
importance of some protest which one otherwise is entitled to voice. In
People v. Klick,' 42 the Illinois Supreme Court relied primarily upon
this consideration in invalidating a statute making it a misdemeanor to
telephone another person with the intent to annoy him. 143 This was
held to be overbroad, since "one may communicate with another with
the possible intention of causing a slight annoyance" without forfeiting
all first amendment protection: "The legislature cannot abridge one's
first amendment freedoms merely to avoid slight annoyances caused to
others." 144
Underlying this and other decisions in this area is the recognition
that "the manner of speech is often inseparable from the underlying
thought, so that if the thought is protected, its expression in a merely
offensive manner should likewise be protected. . . . In fact, offensive
speech is a method of precisely communicating the strength of one's
feelings about one's ideas."' 45 To these considerations may be added
140. Id. at 398, 541 P.2d at 83.
141. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
142. 66 Ill. 2d 269, 362 N.E.2d 329 (1977).
143. Id. at 272-75, 362 N.E.2d 330-32.
144. Id. at 274-75, 362 N.E.2d at 331-32. In City of Oak Park v. Smith, 79 Mich. App.
757, 262 N.W.2d 900 (1977), a motorist gave "the finger" to an out-of-uniform policeman
with whom he was nearly involved in a traffic accident. The court held that an instruction
limiting the application of the ordinance to fighting words was improperly refused. Setting
aside the question of whether there can be fighting words where there are no words at all,
what is interesting is the court's comment that the gesture "was a spontaneous reaction to a
sudden emergency which commonly occurs each day. In such minor stress circumstances,
many drivers utter profane words-a normal reaction in the everyday traffic congestion."
Id. at 762, 262 N.W.2d at 903.
145. Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Ob-
scenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579, 604 (1975) (footnote omitted). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation, 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that to separate the
content of a message from its wording is "transparently fallacious"); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (stressing the emotive as well as the cognitive function of speech).
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one more: the suppression of literary and aesthetic creations deemed
offensive to others has at times done irreparable damage to our cultural
heritage. 146 An intellectual tradition purged of the "offensive personal-
ity" engaged in by the Bible, Aristophanes, Luther, Swift, Pope, Saint-
Simon, Voltaire, Burke, Paine, Proudhon, Marx, 'Kierkegaard and
Wilde, to say nothing of representatives of our own outspoken century,
would be impoverished indeed. Not even the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, drafted by the illustrious lawyer Thomas Jefferson, would be
safe from the censors: in it the founding fathers make many harsh
charges, some of them patently unfair, against George III, whom they
go so far as to call a "tyrant." Yet in California, an attorney can be and
has been punished for calling a member of the bench a "petty
judge."147
Offensiveness, then, is not enough to expose expression to repres-
sion. To the extent that the punishment of offensive utterances is the
manifest purpose of the offensive personality statute, its unconstitution-
ality is apparent.
"Offensive Personality" and Strict Scrutiny
Although the great majority of instances in which expression may
be abridged are covered by the recognized exceptions to the first
amendment protection,148 a residue of special cases does exist. When a
state proposes to restrict speech not falling within an established cate-
gory, courts employ a standard of "strict scrutiny" which reflects the
paramount importance of the affected interest in freedom. Speech may
be restricted, if at all, only if the state demonstrates that the restriction
is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. 149 This standard
requires more than that a law be aimed at some genuine evil and does
in fact alleviate that evil.' 50 A rational connection between the remedy
provided and the evil to be curbed does not suffice where expression is
to be restrained.15' Thus, the identification of a legitimate state inter-
146. See United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
147. Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 808-09, 228 P.2d 554, 555 (1951). But see
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978) (the protection of
the reputation of judges does not justify the suppression of otherwise protected speech).
148. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
149. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Mitchell Family Planning
Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
150. UMW, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
151. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 628 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 241,
411 P.2d 289, 293, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
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est, a burden the government bears, 152 is just the starting point for anal-
ysis. 153 In addition, the purpose of the statute must be one which
cannot be pursued by means less intrusive into individual liberties than
those enacted.154 In this highly sensitive area, only the grossest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible regula-
tion. 155
This strict standard governs attorney discipline statutes as it does
all other state action directed against speech. The bar may not abridge
fundamental constitutional rights: 56 "The First Amendment protects
the freedom of expression of all citizens, including lawyers." 157 A state
may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore
constitutional rights. 158 When attorney discipline limits first amend-
ment rights, the state must demonstrate that the means employed in
furtherance of that interest are closely tailored to avoid unnecessary
abridgement of free speech. 159 The California Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that strict scrutiny is in order when speech repressive rules
of professional responsibility are challenged. 60 This is a test that the
offensive personality statute almost certainly is incapable of passing.
The interest which the statute most likely was intended to further
is, of course, an interest in being spared the experience of disagreeable
speech. But we have seen that Cohen v. California' 6' and other deci-
sions162 have established that such an interest, assuming it is a valid
152. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,
362 (1976).
153. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 857, 574 P.2d 766, 774, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695,
703 (1978); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 766, 533 P.2d 222, 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99
(1975).
154. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 855-56, 574 P.2d 766, 773, 143
Cal. Rptr. 695, 703 (1978).
155. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 855, 574 P.2d 766, 773, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695,
703 (1978).
156. Belli v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 832, 519 P.2d 575, 581, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527, 533
(1974).
157. Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 368, 562 P.2d 1326, 1332, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77, 83
(1977).
158. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
159. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978). The catchphrase to the effect that the
practice of law is a privilege, not a right, has been discarded as irrelevant to bar-related
constitutional adjudication. See Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288,
299-300, 496 P.2d 1264, 1272, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 904 (1972).
160. Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 368, 562 P.2d 1326, 1332, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77, 83
(1977).
161. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See notes 132-35 & accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 136-47 & accompanying text supra.
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state interest at all, is not sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions
on expression. Thus it becomes necessary to speculate as to other pos-
sible rationales.
Another interest which concededly is compelling is the "un-
hindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts."' 63 As written,
however, the offensive personality statute is not narrowly and precisely
drawn to further this interest. Section 6068(f) on its face is not limited
to in-court or even to litigation-related communications. So far as its
language reveals, the statute proscribes "all offensive personality" oc-
curring anywhere, any place, and any time. It penalizes utterances
about any person, 64 addressed to anybody, or nobody. The statement
might take place in private, in circumstances in which no offense is
taken, or in circumstances in which the utterance is wholly unrelated to
the practice of law or the speaker's status as an attorney. Even if the
statute applied only to disparaging references to judges, it still would be
overbroad with respect to these limitations. Judges enjoy "no greater
immunity from criticism than other persons"'165 and the protection of
the reputation of judges does not justify the suppression of speech that
is otherwise protected.166 In fact, the statute contains not even this lim-
itation and it has been applied to punish references to persons other
than judges. 67 Thus the statute is grossly over-inclusive with respect to
the protection of orderly processes of judicial administration. In this
respect, section 6068(f) shares the infirmity of the "offensive conduct"
statute enforced in Cohen v. California.16s As it happened, it was in a
courthouse that Cohen was arrested and the State sought to defend his
conviction by asserting an interest in preserving courtroom decorum.
The Supreme Court held that, with respect to this purpose, the statute
was overbroad:
Any attempt to support this conviction on the ground that the statute
seeks to preserve an appropriately decorous atmosphere in the court-
house where Cohen was arrested must fail in the absence of any lan-
guage in the statute that would have put appellant on notice that
certain kinds of otherwise permissible speech or conduct would nev-
ertheless, under California law, not be tolerated in certain places. No
163. Cox v. Loiusiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).
164. The statute does not specify what legal entities would fall within the meaning of
"person." See notes 208-09 & accompanying text infra.
165. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
166. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978).
167. See, e.g., In re Sadicoff, 208 Cal. 555, 556-57, 282 P. 952, 953 (1929) (reference to
opposing party); Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 129, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 727
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) (reference to opposing counsel).
168. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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fair reading of the phrase "offensive conduct" can be said sufficiently
to inform the ordinary person that distinctions between certain loca-
tions are thereby created. 169
Similarly, no fair reading of the phrase "offensive personality" puts an
attorney on notice that distinctions between locations are created.
There is another reason why the offensive personality subsection
cannot be necessary to further the interest in orderly and decorous
courtroom proceedings, namely, because it is superfluous. Another
subdivision of the same statute imposes a distinct duty on an attorney
to "maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial of-
ficers."' 170 The courts also are invested with contempt power, 17' which
can be and has been invoked to control recourse to disparaging lan-
guage in pleadings and in open court, without reference to offensive
personality. 72 As discussed earlier, 173 no reported offensive personal-
ity case appears in which the power to discipline could not have been
predicated upon the duty to respect judicial officers or the contempt
power. With respect to this purpose, then, the offensive personality
subsection is redundant.
If control of "offensive personality" whenever or wherever it oc-
curs is a compelling interest that cannot be accomplished by statutes
more narrow than section 6068(f), then one could expect to find such
enactments in most or all of the other states. In most jurisdictions, the
Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association
(ABA) is the basis for the rules of attorney discipline. 174 Yet the offen-
169. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
170. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(b) (West 1974).
171. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1209 (West Supp. 1980).
172. See, e.g., Exparte Ewell, 71 Cal. App. 744, 746-49, 236 P. 205, 205-06 (1925); First
Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 335, 348-49, 107 P. 322, 328 (1909).
173. See notes 28-72 & accompanying text supra.
174. The State of Florida also imposes a duty on attorneys "[t]o abstain from all offen-
sive personalities, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged." Florida
Bar v. Hefty, 213 So. 2d 422, 423-24 (Fla. 1968). In a decision manifesting a grotesque
misunderstanding of the meaning of the words, the Florida Supreme Court has held that
attorneys guilty of sexual misconduct may be disbarred for haying "offensive personalities":
"The record of the respondent in this case is sordid indeed and, as indicated, it reflects a
personality that is offensive in the extreme." Id. at 423. The conduct referred to consisted of
sexual relations with the attorney's step-daughter over a seven-year period beginning when
she was age ten. d. A dissenting judge, although also overlooking the court's semantic
blunder, argued that the attorney's conduct, while "reprehensible," was not so directly re-
lated to his professional status as to warrant his disbarment. Id. at 424-25 (Ervin, J., dissent-
ing). As to whether this sexual relationship should have been condemned as abhorrent, see
R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 148-51 (1974); B. HALL, INCEST: BREAKING THE TABU (1975);




sive personality subsection has no counterpart in the ABA Code. In
contrast, the duty to respect the courts and the parties to litigation has
its substantial equivalent in the Code.175 The scarcity of offensive per-
sonality statutes says much about their necessity in protecting courts
and judges.
Another possibility is that the statute advances a moralistic interest
in elevating the tone of public discourse. Again, in Cohen v. Calfor-
nia,' 76 the Supreme Court rejected the view that the states "as guardi-
ans of public morality" have an overriding interest in suppressing
offensive utterance.' 77 "Morality" as envisaged by those in power at
any particular time is not an interest that justifies the suppression of
speech. Rather, ours is a system that fosters "individual freedom of
mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity."'' 7 8 Certainly
the advocacy of ideas is protected even if they are contrary to the moral
standards or religious precepts of the majority. 179 This protection is
premised on the belief that the first amendment is incompatible with a
paternalistic approach to what people may hear; °80 indeed, the theory
of limited government implicit in our institutions arguably is inconsis-
tent with any state interest in the enforcement of morals.' 8 1 "The pur-
pose that originally animated the American political project was the
maximization of individual autonomy, not the inculcation of moral-
ity. . . . The furtherance of a state approved moral code, far from
amounting to a compelling state interest, cannot properly serve as a
state interest at all."' 8 2
175. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(2),
(6).
176. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
177. Id. at 22-25.
178. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
179. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89
(1959). See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
180. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978).
181. Black, Obscenity andFreedom ofExpression in Michigan, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 27,
55-57 (1978); see American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Department of State Police, 11 Mich. App.
351, 353-54, 158 N.W.2d 72, 73-74 (1968).
182. Black, Obscenity andFreedom of Expression in Michigan, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 27,
57 (1978) (taking the position that society is without legitimate authority to place limits on
the individual's freedom except to the extent necessary to assure conditions of maximum
equitably shared freedom). Accord, B. RUSSELL, POLITICAL IDEALS 29 (1917); H. SPENCER,
SOCIAL STATICS 95 (1954); THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: REPRESEN-
TATIVE SELECTIONS 55 (E. Dumbauld ed. 1955). Essentially, the argument is that because
society derives its just power from the consent of its members, the purposes for which people.
maintain a society justify and thereby limit the extent of the power conferred on its organs.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (arguing that some substantive doc-
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Nor is the situation appreciably different merely because the
morals of lawyers are to be policed. The state has no regulatory power
over the private life of an attorney. 18 3 Immoral conduct as such is not a
permissible object of legislation regulating attorneys, absent a direct
relationship with fitness to practice law. 184 As the United States
Supreme Court has observed:
A bar composed of lawyers of good moral character is a worthy ob-
jective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to
obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar itself
that lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak, and act as mem-
bers of an Independent Bar.' 85
Because section 6068(f) makes no allowance for circumstances and
lacks the requisite connection with legal practice, it is seriously over-
broad even if the enforcement of morals is presumed to be a proper
purpose of attorney discipline. A professional surely is guilty of no
misconduct, for instance, for employing language some might find of-
fensive in a private communication, unrelated to the professional's
practice, addressed to a willing recipient.186 Yet the offensive personal-
trines of constitutional law may be deduced directly from the structure of the Constitution,
even absent explicit textual support).
It has been suggested that the principle of greatest equal liberty, whatever its place in
American constitutional government generally, at least affords an appropriate framework
for the resolution of free speech issues. See Richards, Free Speech and Obscenitfy Law. To-
ward a Moral Theory ofthe First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 73 (1974). It is interest-
ing that George Sharswood, from whose book on legal ethics the modern codes of
professional responsibility are descended, subscribed to the libertarian theory: "It is the
inalienable right of men to pursue their own happiness; each man under such restraints of
law as will leave every other man equally free to do the same. The true, and only object of
government is to secure this right." G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
20 (5th ed. 1896).
183. Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1927). But see In re Hicks, 163
Okla. 29, 20 P.2d 896 (1933) (disbarring an attorney for immoral conduct based on sexual
relations with incompetent).
184. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Hallinan v. Commit-
tee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 459-60, 421 P.2d 76, 86, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 238 (1966).
185. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (footnote omitted).
186. In Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 12 Ohio Misc.
288, 288, 233 N.E.2d 143, 145 (C.P. 1967), a high school teacher wrote two letters to a former
student sent by first-class mail: "They contain language which many adults would find
gross, vulgar and offensive and which some 18-year-old males would find unsurprising and
fairly routine." They were found by the youth's mother, who turned them over to the police.
The police released the letters to the school board which employed the teacher; he was ter-
minated for "immorality." Id. at 289, 233 N.E.2d at 145. A court ordered him reinstated,
observing with some asperity: "The private speech or writing of a teacher, not in any way
inimical to that welfare [of the school community], are absolutely immaterial to the applica-
tion of such standard." Id. at 290, 233 N.E.2d at 145. See also Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf
Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 741, 227 P.2d 449, 454 (1951).
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ity statute allows for no exceptions.1 87 The statute fails to accomodate
a consideration that all but the most militantly puritan would acknowl-
edge, ie., that there is nothing wrong with offensive personality be-
tween consenting adults. There is simply no need to pry into an
attorney's personal affairs to determine whether a lawyer is honest or
faithful to clients. 8 8 The power of the state to regulate the professions
must not arbitrarily impair the right of the individual to live a private
life, apart from his or her profession, as he or she sees fit. 189 "The pur-
pose of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. . . was to take government
off the backs of people."' 90 For this reason, the individual liberty se-
cured by the Constitution is ultimately irreconcilable with the authori-
tarian moralism implicit in the offensive personality statute.
The Vagueness of "Offensive Personality"
As a matter of due process, a penal statute is void for vagueness if
those subject to it have no way of knowing in advance what conduct
conforms to or conflicts with the law. In other words, due process re-
quires that a statute give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what conduct is prohibited.19' A person is entitled to know what the
state commands or forbids. 92 The courts are particularly alert to the
chilling effect of vague enactments impinging upon the exercise of first
amendment rights, since "where a vague statute 'abuts upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the
exercise of [those) freedoms.' 193 Statutes authorizing professional dis-
cipline, like other statutes, are subject to attack for vagueness. 194 The
187. This discussion presupposes that the duty to abstain from all offensive personality
is a distinct obligation in itself. As previously noted, it is possible and preferable to read the
statute differently so as to limit the scope of the subsection to litigation related communica-
tions. See notes 25-26 & accompanying text supra.
188. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971) (Black, J.).
189. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214,221, 461 P.2d 375,379-80, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 179-80 (1969).
190. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968). See note 182 supra.
191. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
192. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
193. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bul-
litt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964), and Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287
(1961)). Vagueness is not the same as overbreadth, but a statute may impinge upon first
amendment freedoms because it is both vague and overbroad. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 250-51 (1967).
194. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 230-31, 461 P.2d 375, 387,
82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 187 (1969); cf. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1967) (Magnuson Act
provision touching first amendment provisions should not be broadly construed).
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label applied to the proceeding--civil, criminal, or "disciplinary"-is,
in this context, irrelevant: "If the individual's fundamental rights are
violated it is immaterial whether the statute or proceedings are civil or
criminal in nature." 195
A statute may be vague in either or both of two ways which are not
always properly distinguished. A particular statute may be vague sim-
ply because its language is so imprecise or its internal organization so
incoherent that one cannot be sure what it prohibits. Or it may be
vague because, although its terms are precise enough, it nonetheless
subjects the exercise of a right to an unascertainable standard. 196 The
offensive personality statute, whose "somewhat cryptic" language has
never been clarified by construction, 197 is vague in both respects.
Where free speech is concerned, a cryptic statute is an unconstitutional
statute, "[f]or standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in
the area of free expression."' 198
Unascertainability or "Perfect" Vagueness
The offensive personality statute is what Professor Laurence Tribe
calls a "perfectly vague" statute: "[O]ne which provides 'no ascertain-
able standard for inclusion or exclusion' and is thus vague in all its
applications." '199 The leading case on this type of vagueness is Coates v.
City of Cincinnati,20 0 in which the United States Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance making it a crime for three or more persons to as-
semble on the sidewalk "and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by."' 20 1 The infirmity of such a formula-
tion is not that its language is nebulous-we all know how it feels to be
annoyed-but rather that it determines the punishability of conduct by
195. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 969, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244 (1977).
196. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
197. 7 CAL. JUR. 3d Attorneys at Law § 75, at 344-45 (1973).
198. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
199. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-29, at 720 (1978). A more in-
formative term, "unascertainability vagueness," is employed hereafter in contradistinction
to the "unintelligibility vagueness" of a merely imprecise, disorganized, or otherwise obscure
enactment.
200. 402 U.S. 611 (1971). The articulation of unascertainability vagueness as an in-
dependent standard in Coates was a development in constitutional law whose significance
remains underestimated. Very often courts and litigants suppose that once they have estab-
lished that the language of a statute makes sense, they necessarily have determined that it is
not vague. But a statute that prescribes adherence to an unascertainable standard of conduct
is vague even if it is readily intelligible. For vagueness analyses which overlooked this issue,
see State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 667, 670-71, 298 A.2d 52, 53-54 (1972-74); People
v. Hayes, 82 Mich. App. 253, 258-59, 266 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1978).
201. 402 U.S. at 611 n.l.
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reference to the actual, subjective, necessarily unpredictable reactions
of third parties. Since one cannot gauge the sensibilities of bystanders
without actually engaging in behavior that may later turn out to have
annoyed them-when it is too late to do anything about it- a person
cannot be sure what conduct is forbidden.202 The state court in Coates,
which incorrectly upheld the ordinance, "did not indicate upon whose
sensitivity a violation does depend-the sensitivity of the judge or jury,
the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypotheti-
cally reasonable man. 20 3
Coates is dispositive of the perfect vagueness issue presented by
California's offensive personality statute. Just as conduct that annoys
some people does not annoy others, so conduct that offends some peo-
ple does not offend others. Indeed, "annoying" and "offensive" are
synonyms.2°4 Nothing in the statute or the cases that have applied it
suggests that its standard is anything other than what a literal reading
suggests: that the punishability of "personality" varies according to the
sensitivities of someone who sees or hears the language in question.
Yet whether personality is offensive must vary from person to person
and from time to time even for the same person, depending upon cir-
cumstances which the communicator may or may not be able to antici-
pate. Presumably one could engage in "offensive personality" by
uttering ill-chosen words on a day when the auditor's breakfast dis-
agreed with him or her, but not, perhaps, if he or she slept soundly or
won the office lottery. Such results show why it is intolerable for "the
terms of the statute and the content of the First Amendment [to] shift
with the mentation and emotional status of the recipient of the verbal
202. Id. at 614. The Court in Coates stated: "Conduct that annoys some people does
not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to
conform to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that
no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id.
203. Id. Similarly, in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), the Court struck down an
enactment punishing people for "treatfing] contemptuously" the American flag because it
subjected conduct to a standard "so indefinite that police, court, and jury were free to react
to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag." Id. at 578; cf. Palmer
v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (suspicious person ordinance struck down for vague-
ness and unascertainable standards of guilt). For the same reason, a proscription of "insult-
ing" speech is void for vagueness. City of Oak Park v. Smith, 79 Mich. App. 757, 759, 262
N.W.2d 900, 902 (1977).
204. People v. Pallares, 112 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 895, 901,246 P.2d 173, 176 (1952) (con-
struing "annoys" in former California Penal Code § 647a(l) to mean, inter alia, "offend"); 7
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 78 (1933) ("offensive" means "annoying"); WEBSTER'S NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 108 (2d ed. 1961) ("annoy"
means "offend").
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communication. '2 0 5 To the extent that the offensive personality statute,
unlike the ordinance in Coates, represents a restriction on pure expres-
sion, its infirmities are even less acceptable in light of the stricter stan-
dard of permissible vagueness to which speech repressive statutes are
held.
Unintelligibility Vagueness
Additionally, section 6068(f) may be unconstitutionally vague be-
cause of the obscurity of its terminology and the ambiguity of its inter-
nal arrangement. Penal laws are obliged to be explicit and meaningful
enough to give those governed by them fair notice of what is ex-
pected.206 Whatever might have been the case in 1872, the archaic term
"personality" does not convey to the average contemporary California
attorney any intelligible meaning. 207 Working with words is the busi-
ness of attorneys, but an attorney ought not to be held to the standard
of knowledge of a philologist. Even if this semantic hurdle is sur-
mounted, and "personality" understood to mean references to "per-
sons," we must ask if this word should be taken in its broader legal or
its narrower everyday meaning. Technically, the State Bar of Califor-
nia is a corporation,20 8 hence a "person";20 9 does it follow that any crit-
icism of the Bar by an attorney is offensive personality? Reform-
minded attorneys would be unhappy to hear that criticizing multina-
tional corporations is unethical conduct for California lawyers. Over
and above these difficulties is the structural ambiguity of the statute,
which, as previously noted,2 10 may be interpreted to define either one
offense or two.
No limiting and clarifying construction has ever been placed on
section 6068, and probably none will be, because it is the practice of the
California Supreme Court to invalidate unconstitutional speech-repres-
sive enactments rather than place a saving construction on them.
2t t
This statute displays all the vices of vague legislation: it may trap the
205. Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Alaska 1971).
206. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Katz v. Superior Court,
73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 969-70, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1977).
207. See notes 20-23 & accompanying text supra.
208. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 9; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6001 (West 1974).
209. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 525 (1839); Douglass v. Pacific
Mail S.S. Co., 4 Cal. 304, 306 (1854) (holding that a corporation is a legal person).
210. See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
211. Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 838, 489 P.2d
809, 816, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777, 784 (1971). See also United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,
356 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
innocent by not affording fair warning, it lends itself to arbitrary and
discriminatory application, and it tends to inhibit the exercise of first
amendment freedoms by motivating those affected to steer far clear of
the unlawful zone.212 In a nonspeech context, the problematic features
of the statute might not be fatal. But where expression alone is the
overt object of repression, much more in the way of clarity and preci-
sion is constitutionally compelled.213
The Ubiquity of "Offensive Personality"
The California Supreme Court wisely has observed that what is
considered moral today may be considered absurd tomorrow.214
Equally true, of course, is an analogous proposition: what was consid-
ered moral yesterday may be considered absurd today. History ap-
pears to have overtaken the offensive personality statute, whose
incongruity with contemporary habits of speech is so pronounced as to
render the rule almost grotesque. Justice Powell has observed, by no
means approvingly, that offensive language is endemic in our society:
"Language likely to offend the sensibility of some listeners is now fairly
commonplace in many social gatherings as well as in public perform-
ances. '215 At least one court has taken judicial notice of the ubiquity of
such utterances.216 Language once disparaged, with open class bias, as
"gutter language" is now rife in the highest reaches of government and
society. 217 While there remain many circumstances in which offensive
212. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Katz v. Superior Court,
73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 969-70, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1977).
213. The foregoing analysis of speech related issues has been limited to federal constitu-
tional questions. In California, however, the "first referent is California law and the full
panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due." People v. Longwill, 14
Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1975). The free-expression
guarantee of the California Constitution is more inclusive than the federal first amendment.
Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472
(1975); Van de Camp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 529 n.2, 142
Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (1977). Since the ambit of protected expression is widened in California,
the previously demonstrated overbreadth of the offensive-personality statute is correspond-
ingly aggravated. For discussions of state constitutional guarantees as independent bases of
libertarian reform in constitutional law, see Black, Obscenity and Freedom of Expression in
Michigan, 56 U. DET. J. URB. 27 (1978); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
214. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 226, 461 P.2d 375, 383, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175, 183 (1969).
215. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
216. State v. Davis, 132 Vt. 290, 294, 318 A.2d 664, 666 (1974).
217. An example is President Carter's comment: "If Kennedy runs, I'll whip his ass."
San Francisco Chronicle, June 14, 1979, at 1, col. 2. Other recent occupants of this exalted
office have been even more given to this type of utterance. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
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personality is out of place and ill-received, a universal ban can no
longer be squared with contemporary values and practices.
Might it be that lawyers, unlike other men and women, adhere to a
higher standard of linguistic propriety? Those who are attorneys and
those who deal with them know better. There is no impenetrable bar-
rier between law and life. Lawyers live in the same world as everyone
else, even though they also move in a special sphere of their own crea-
tion, using words which often mystify the uninitiated. Whatever forces
have operated to break down the Victorian standards of decorum pro-
fessed when the offensive personality statute was enacted must have
had their impact on lawyers as well. Quite possibly the articulation
and imposition of repressive norms was itself one incitement to their
infraction: Michel Foucault has noted that since the eighteenth century
"the tightening up of the rules of decorum likely did produce, as a
countereffect, a valorization and intensification of indecent speech."' 218
What is not difficult to demonstrate is that, with respect to attorneys,
the offensive personality ban has long coexisted with modalities of of-
fensive expression by attorneys that not only are taken for granted but
are sanctioned by the highest arbiters of legal ethics.
In California, the law is well settled that prosecutors may use "ap-
propriate epithets" to refer to a criminal defendant if the language is
warranted by the evidence.219 Thus, in the presence of the jury in a
particular case, one may speak of an accused as a "sneaky mother-
killer," 220 a liar, "the lowest of the lows," 2 2 1 or "a smart thief and a
parasite on the community. 2 22 Such cases raise questions about the
possibly prejudicial impact of the comments on the fairness of the trial,
but in none of these cases is there even an intimation that the attorney
in question has transgressed a duty "to abstain from all offensive per-
sonality. z22 3 Yet compared to these in-court insults, references to indi-
438 U.S. 726, 771 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that if offensive material can-
not be broadcast by radio, the Nixon tapes would have to be excluded from the airwaves).
218. 1 M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 18 (1978).
219. People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 397, 326 P.2d 457, 464 (1958); People v. Rodriguez,
10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 36-37, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789, 801 (1970).
220. People v. Hardenbrook, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 352, 309 P.2d 424, 429 (1957).
221. People v. La Fontaine, 79 Cal. App. 3d 176, 186, 144 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1978).
222. People v. Rodriguez, 10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 36, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789, 801 (1970). Simi-
larly, in a prosecution for a sex crime a prosecutor may state that the defendant has "the
sexual appetite of a barbarian or an ape." People v. Ross, 178 Cal. App. 2d 801, 808, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 170, 174 (1960). Although such invective usually is indulged in by prosecutors, de-
fense counsel may join in too. See People v. Perry, 7 Cal. 3d 756, 789, 499 P.2d 129, 150, 103
Cal. Rptr. 161, 182 (1972) (hostile witness referred to as "scum").
223. It might be argued that these utterances fall within the statutory exception for utter-
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viduals as "Your Majesty" 224 or a "high-priced lawyer' 225 seem tepid
indeed and hardly justify discipline.
Moreover, the judiciary itself is not altogether innocent of offen-
sive personality. Distinguished judges of the California Court of Ap-
peal once referred to a dissident colleague in an opinion as a
"schmuck. ' 226 Until recently, this would have been thought to go
somewhat beyond the usual limits of judicial invective, to be shrugged
off, perhaps, as one more eccentric expression of California culture.
Recently, however, evidence has come to light that these California ju-
rists are anything but atypical in their candor: their counterparts on the
United States Supreme Court appear to be at least equally frank in
discussing one another. Justice Brennan, for instance, purportedly re-
ferred to the Chief Justice as "[t]hat son of a bitch. ' 227 Chief Justice
Burger, in turn, allegedly once referred to Justice Douglas as either
"stupid" or "lying. ' 228 In addition, Justice Douglas apparently had oc-
casion to refer to Justice Marshall as "spaghetti spine." 229 Many in the
legal community regard these disclosures as unseemly and spiteful,
which may well be true, but they certainly reveal nonetheless the hy-
pocrisy of punishing isolated episodes of offensive personality. This sit-
uation tends to confirm Alex Comfort's conclusion that "centralized
urban cultures, including our own, have come to select in detail the
types of individual delinquency, otherwise indistinguishable, which
they tolerate or reward on the one hand, and reprobate and punish on
the other. '230
ances "required by the justice of the'cause with which [an attorney] is charged." CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6068(f) (West 1974). But while these comments obviously are advanta-
geous to the party resorting to them, does justice ever require references to anyone as a
parasite, scum, or a sneaky mother-killer?
224. Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 1240, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406, 408
(1976).
225. Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 129-30, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 727
(1974), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
226. Although the official report of the opinion, as modified, makes the majority's refer-
ence more oblique, the reference is unquestionably clear. People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d
505, 514 n.2, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 628 (1979). The dissent roundly criticized the majority's
language without responding "in kind." Id. at 538 n.14, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (Hanson, J.,
dissenting). See also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 635 (1958) (Brennan, J.) ("[d]issenting
opinions in our reports are apt to make petitioner's speech look like tame stuff indeed").
227. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 267 (1979). Justice Brennan is
also reported to have referred to the Chief Justice as "a usurper," id. at 272, and once, when
summoned to Burger's office, turned to his clerks and purportedly commented, "Dummy
wants me." Id. at 359. The accuracy of Woodward and Armstrong's sources and investiga-
tive methods are not beyond question, however. See, e.g., New York Times Book review,
Dec. 16, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (review of THE BRETHREN by Renata Adler).
228. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, 181 (1979).
229. Id. at 279.
230. A. COMFORT, AUTHORITY AND DELINQUENCY IN THE MODERN STATE 7 (1950).
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If the judicial elite and the rank-and-file attorneys have lapsed
from duty, what then of the very body selected to enforce California's
offensive personality statute, the State Bar? We know that as recently
as four years ago the State Bar not only disciplined an attorney for
offensive personality but defended its action in the California Supreme
Court.23' Unfortunately, the record of the State Bar itself reveals con-
duct remarkably similar to that which the Bar has disciplined. The
pages of the Bar's own official publications are besmirched by offensive
personality. A single source provides convenient examples: the col-
umn written by Edward L. Lascher, former member of the Board of
Governors of the State Bar, in the official Caifornia State Bar Journal.
This is done not to criticize Mr. Lascher but to make a point about
offensive personality and the abusrdity of its proscription.
Mr. Lascher has a somewhat unflattering perception of his erst-
while colleagues on the Board. In fact, he says the Board of Governors
is "a clown act," adding: "The body that's supposed to be running our
profession has become a zoo; the inmates have taken over the asylum,
and I am sick at heart. '232 Lascher's opinion of Chief Justice Burger
and F. Lee Bailey is likewise poor, both of whom he believes are unjus-
tifiably immodest and verbose.233 In a more recent column Lascher
assailed Marvin Mitchelson, Michelle Marvin's lawyer, for the "asinin-
ity" of his request for an attorney's fee from the state234 and sarcasti-
cally urged his disbarment.235 Lascher then completed his barrage of
insults by calling Mitchelson "reckless," "too dangerous to have
around," and guilty of "willful, wanton and reckless endangering of the
judicial branch. '236
Both Lascher and his publishers would be surprised to learn that
Lascher may have committed the offense of "offensive personality" in
231. Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1976). See
text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
232. Lascher, Lascher at Large, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 58, 58 (1978).
233. Lascher, Lascher at Large, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 178, 178 (1978): "It would be no trick
at all to find two members of the legal profession whom I admire more than Warren Burger
and Flee Bailey. Among the more unendearing qualities which they share are exaggerated
opinions of themselves and perpetual-motion pens and mouths. ...
"The rantings of the Chief-who has managed to convince himself that he holds the
office because of some meritorious qualities rather than (as everybody else knows) because
he was absolutely, certain, John Mitchell-certifiable tame-regarding the percentage of law-
yers he perceives to be incompetent are inherently noxious. ...
"And Flee Bailey? So close on the heels of the Patty Hearst Trial and the Las Vegas
Seminar Caper he wants to lecture us on lawyer incompetence?" Id.




nearly every issue of the California State Par Journal published during
the last two years. But then the very possibility of discipline for offen-
sive personality represents an unpleasant surprise for most attorneys.
Presumably, almost every attorney engages in offensive personality oc-
casionally and for a significant minority it probably is an ingrained
feature of their everyday speech; regarding offensive personality, the
"dark figure"2 37 approaches one hundred percent. Any serious nondis-
criminatory attempt to enforce the statute would decimate the profes-
sion unless, as seems likely, the ranks of the enforcers were self-
depleted first from the same cause. Even if the purification of attorney
discourse represented a desirable ideal, executing such a project is im-
possible in the world in which real lawyers live.238
The Politics of Offensive Personality
The prior discussion has not exhausted the objections to the offen-
sive personality law; the worst remains to be said. The statute is obso-
lete, obscure, and rather silly. In its potential for abuse, however, it is
anything but silly. Section 6068(f) threatens all lawyers, but it does not
threaten all lawyers equally. It might be used against anyone, but will
not be used against just anyone. By now the speech the statute is in-
tended to suppress is engaged in by nearly everybody, but it is not
equally important to everybody. In form as in content, language is es-
sentially political and social.239 Corresponding to the varying circum-
stances and goals of different people are divergent modes of speech.
The language of the oppressed and the language of their oppressors is
never the same.240 De Tocqueville observed that linguistic differentia-
237. By the "dark figure," criminologists refer to the number of unreported cases of
crime. L. RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 63 (1966).
238. This is not to imply that there ever was a time when the statute was realistic in
terms of actual usage among lawyers. Clarence Darrow, among other eminent attorneys of
earlier periods, routinely resorted to offensive personality in the courtroom and elsewhere.
His address to the jury in his own defense during his Los Angeles bribery trial affords many
examples. According to Darrow, the prosecutor committed a "cowardly, sneaky and brutal
act" in vilifying Darrow in his address to the jury: "It was brutal and low, and every man
knows it." C. DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 494 (A. Weinberg ed. 1957). Warm-
ing to his subject, Darrow added: "It was not worthy of a man and it did not come from a
man." Id. at 495. Darrow spoke of the prosecutor as "licking his picturesque chops in glee
at my destruction," and identified certain business interests as the prosecutor's real "mas-
ters." Id. at 498. One of the state's witnesses, similarly, was a "contemptible liar." Id. at
503. Darrow was acquitted.
239. See generally R. BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (1972).
240. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE
431-41 (1976) (comparing the speech of the slaves with that of the slaveholders in the ante-
bellum south).
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tion is characteristic of class society:
In these ages each nation is divided into a certain number of classes,
which see but little of each other and do not intermingle. Each of
these classes contracts and invariably retains habits of mind peculiar
to itself and adopts by choice certain terms which afterwards pass
from generation to generation, like their estates.24 1
Repression of offensive language falls most heavily upon those among
the oppressed whose ordinary speech or "street language" is deemed
offensive by the upper classes.242 Of course, insofar as the legal profes-
sion is recruited from the elite, this discriminatory impact is not a prob-
lem, or rather it recedes before a graver problem. Insofar as the
profession purports to and to some extent does open up to minorities,
the poor, and the working class, its implicitly racist and class-based
rules of decorum operate, as legal ethics has done for some time,243
either to eliminate the upstarts or to mold them into conformance with
the tastes of the governors.
Like the language of deprivation, the languages of dissidence and
deviance are vulnerable to repression for offensiveness. The status quo
has its own conventionally sanctioned style of expression, for "all or-
thodoxy, whether religious or political, postulates the usual expres-
sion. ' 244 As George Orwell recognized, orthodox expression is anemic
expression: "Orthodoxy, of whatever colour, seems to demand a life-
less, imitative style."245 The privileged inevitably are offended by
speech that subverts their position and questions their certitudes. Rev-
olutionaries have long recognized that language itself is a terrain that
must be fought for, against the existing order.246 Notably, when our
legal system-which was not only the scene but the very instrument of
241. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 67 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
242. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. See note 8 supra.
244. E. CIORAN, THE TEMPTATION TO EXIST 156 (1970).
245. G. ORWELL, The Politics of the English Language, in 4 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS,
JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 135 (S. Orwell & I. Angus ed. 1968).
246. The semiologist Roland Barthes provides an example from the French Revolution:
"Hbert, the revolutionary, never began a number of his news-sheet Le Pre Duch.ne with-
out introducing a sprinkling of obscenities. These improprieties had no real meaning, but
they had significance. In what way? In that they expressed a whole revolutionary situation.
Now here is an example of a mode of writing whose function is no longer only communica-
tion or expression, but the imposition of something beyond language, which is both History
and the stand we take in it." R. BARTHES, WRITING DEGREE ZERO 1 (1968). One of
H~bert's modem successors, an anonymous situationist, articulates the same truth as does
Barthes: "The problem of language is at the heart of every struggle between those who wish
to abolish alienation and those who wish to preserve it... "All the King's Men, in LEAV-
ING THE 20TH CENTURY 76 (C. Gray ed. 1974).
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OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY
class conflict in earlier periods247-became a political battleground in
the 1960s,248 "offensive personality" became at once an issue and a tac-
tic in politico-legal skirmishes like the Chicago Seven trial.249 In re-
versing the dismissal of a teacher for using a familiar "vulgar term for
an incestuous son," the First Circuit stated that "it might well take judi-
cial notice of its use by young radicals and protesters from coast to
coast." 250
The offensive personality statute thus applies "equally" to attor-
neys for the elite who rarely have reason to lose their composure and to
attorneys for the damned251 who may have to raise their voices to be
heard. To suppress offensive speech is absurd to anyone "who envi-
sions our society in anything but a state of languid repose. ' 252 For the
powerful and their hangers-on, however, our society is in a state of
languid repose, or rather it would be if the agitators and troublemakers
could somehow be silenced. Those at the top have no need to be offen-
sive.253 Those at the bottom-the poor, the workers, women, prisoners,
criminals, children, and sometimes their lawyers (when they have
any)--sometimes speak in less reassuring tones and terms.
Conclusion
"Lawyers by training are a cautious breed. '254 If attorneys in Cal-
ifornia do not feel especially terrorized by the offensive personality
statute, the reason probably is that they have never heard of section
6068(f) of the Business and Professions Code. A lawyer should not be
compelled to weigh every word,255 but that is precisely where enforce-
ment of the offensive personality statute would lead. No one can dis-
247. See M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1977).
248. See Stanmeyer, The New Left and the Old Law, 55 A.B.A.J. 319 (1969).
249. See J. LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER OBSCENITIES (1970).
250. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (Ist Cir. 1969).
251. See note 238 supra.
252. Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 398, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (1975).
253. If those in power occasionally are offensive, a double standard affords some meas-
ure of protection. "That which reflects acceptable values is spirited, while that which offends
is rabid, emotional, or off the wall. An establishment that frequently conducts itself with
minimal good manners requires civility only of those with whom it disagrees." Schofield,
Introduction to J. LEMISH, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN WAR AND PEACE 7 (1975). Women and
children are prominent victims of this double standard. "Cursing" by women or minors is
regarded as much worse than the same language employed by adult males. S. FIRESTONE,
THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 88 (rev. ed. 1971). See generally R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WO-
MAN'S PLACE (1975); C. MILLER & K. SWIFT, WORDS AND WOMEN (1976).
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pute that the public has an interest in the fitness of the legal profession.
Nonetheless a repressive law that does not clearly further the interest in
competent and conscientious attorneys necessarily frustrates that goal
by interfering with the practice of some attorneys for irrelevant reasons.
The public interest is not served but rather stymied by a purged and
policed profession homogenized into a bovine herd adhering in its
every word and deed to some lowest common denominator of innocu-
ousness.
256
Like some other rules of legal ethics, the offensive personality stat-
ute has "a distinct potential for . . . permitting discretionary enforce-
ment against unpopular causes. '257 The repression of offensive
language has its severest impact upon those "who, for a variety of rea-
sons, including a conscious desire to flaunt majoritarian conventions,
express themselves using words that may be regarded as offensive by
those from different socio-economic backgrounds. '258 Moreover, of-
fensive personality is not inundating other discourse, with bad taste
driving out good by some sort of linguistic Gresham's Law. Even in
the absence of a statute, inopportune offensive personality remains sub-
ject to the salutory restraints of "the natural government of conse-
quences. '259 Despite its various valuable uses, nobody believes that
offensive personality is a good in itself. It nonetheless merits protection
for the sake of some of those who employ it and for some of the pur-
poses it serves. In the last analysis, offensive personality may be better
than no personality at all.
256. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 115-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Saw-
yer, 360 U.S. 622, 635 (1959) (Brennan, J.).
257. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 433 (1978).
258. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. Warren, Equity in Education, in PATrERNS OF ANARCHY 448 (L. Krimerman & L.
Perry ed. 1966).
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